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Abstract
Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often associated with a certain po-
litical mode of relating to another, where a person (“a Citizen”) 
is a locus of enforceable demands. I claim that Rousseau also 
articulated an affective mode of relating to another, where a per-
son is seen as the locus of a kind of value (expressive of their 
being an independent point of view) that cannot be demand-
ed. These are not isolated sides of a distinction, for the political 
mode constitutes a solution to certain problems that the affective 
mode encounters in common social circumstances, allowing us 
to see how these modes might be distinct while the political nev-
ertheless shapes the affective. I contrast this approach with that 
of some contemporary Kantian writers on affective phenomena 
(Sarah Buss on shame, and J. David Velleman on love) who, for 
reasons rooted in Kant’s moral philosophy, have modeled affec-
tive ways of relating to others on duty. I claim that Rousseau’s 
writing provides us with a way of capturing the correct insight 
of these accounts—that some of our emotional responses to oth-
ers are ways of appreciating their personhood—while avoiding 
the characteristic implausibilities of their close association be-
tween the affective and the political.
Keywords: Jean-Jacques Rousseau; Immanuel Kant; Sarah 
Buss; J. David Velleman; personhood; shame; love; moral psy-
chology.
Resumen
Jean-Jacques Rousseau suele asociarse con un cierto modo 
político de relacionarse con otro, donde una persona (“un 
ciudadano”) es un lugar de demandas exigibles. Yo sostengo que 
Rousseau también articuló un modo afectivo de relacionarse con 
los otros, donde una persona es vista como un lugar de un tipo 
de valor (expresiva de su ser un punto de vista independiente) 
que no puede ser demandado. Estos no son lados aislados de 
una distinción, pues el modo político constituye una solución 
a ciertos problemas que el modo afectivo encuentra en 
circunstancias sociales comunes, pemitiéndonos ver cómo estos 
modos pueden ser distintos mientras que lo político da forma 
a lo afectivo. Contrasto esta aproximación con la de algunos 
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filósofos kantianos sobre los fenómenos afectivos (Sarah Buss 
sobre la vergüenza y J. David Velleman sobre el amor), quienes, 
por razones basadas en la filosofía moral de Kant, han modelado 
caminos afectivos para relacionarse con los otros en la base del 
deber. Sostengo que los escritos de Rousseau nos ofrece una 
manera de capturar la visión correcta de estos relatos: que 
algunas de nuestras respuestas emocionales a los demás son 
formas de apreciar su estado de ser persona, al tiempo que evitan 
las inverosimilitudes características de su estrecha asociación 
entre lo afectivo y lo político. 
Palabras clave: Jean-Jacques Rousseau; Immanuel Kant; 
Sarah Buss; J. David Velleman; personalidad; vergüenza; amor; 
psicología moral. 
Just as questions about the nature and identity of persons can be 
understood as among the distinctive concerns of Western metaphysics, 
so questions about what it is to relate to another as a person, as opposed 
to a thing, can be understood as among the distinctive concerns of Wes-
tern ethical and political thought, at least since the eighteenth century. 
Normally treatments of this topic have focused on a political or legal 
mode of relating to another as a person. Characteristic of this mode is 
that another person is seen as a locus of enforceable demands: they can 
legitimately demand certain kinds of conduct from us (in virtue of our 
also being persons), and we can demand certain kinds of conduct from 
them (in virtue of their being persons).
Modern philosophical treatments of this political mode of relating 
to another as a person emerge directly out of the writings of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, and in particular his articulation of the notion of a 
“Citizen” in The Social Contract.1 But Rousseau was keen to circumscribe 
this mode to specifically political contexts. Moreover, Rousseau also 
articulated an affective mode of relating to another as a person: a mode 
characteristic of the affective realm of our lives, whose defining feature 
throughout Rousseau’s writings is (in contrast with the political realm) 
the precluding of enforceable demands. (Or rather: the entrance of 
1  Such treatments, especially those of a Hegelian provenance, also tend 
to locate the origins of this form in Roman society and law  (see Taylor, 1975, p. 
397). Despite the ancient origins of the mode, its modern articulations (including 
Hegel on “Abstract Right”) are strongly influenced by Rousseau’s Social Contract.
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enforceable demands into the affective realm marks its characteristic 
pathology.) Thus, under the affective mode, seeing another as a person 
consists in seeing them as an independent point of view, and as a limit 
on what one can bring about by force.
Often in Rousseau’s writing this distinction—between political 
and affective modes of relating to persons—functions diagnostically: 
Rousseau tends to locate philosophical and political errors in someone’s 
thinking of one mode of relating to another in terms appropriate to 
the other. For example, in his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (or 
Second Discourse), Rousseau argues against attempts to ground political 
obligation in “Paternal Power,”2 or the child’s obligations to the 
father, as the latter consists in the child’s gratitude, which (in contrast 
with political obligation) “is not a right that can be exacted” (DI: 177/
OC: 3:182; cf. DPE: 4-5/OC: 3:242-244; E: 234/OC: 4:521). Conversely, 
Rousseau elsewhere criticizes attempts to change public opinion by 
force or by legislation on the ground that “public opinion is not subject 
to constraint” (SC: IV.7.7) and that “force [has] no power over minds” 
(LD: 67/OC: 5:62). Thus, in a discussion drawing on purported attempts 
by Louis XIV to change public opinion by legislation, Rousseau in effect 
understands the sovereign not as relating to independent points of view 
(as is required, according to him, even in the “art” of changing public 
opinion; cf. LD: 69/OC: 5:64), but as objects of political demands. Or, 
in other words, changing minds (without violence) requires relating to 
persons affectively rather than politically.3
But my concern in this paper is not so much the diagnostic function 
of this distinction in Rousseau’s writing as it is a broader story he tells 
about the relationship between the affective and the political modes. 
This is a story according to which these modes are not isolated sides of 
a distinction; rather, the political mode emerges as a solution to certain 
characteristic problems with the affective mode in common social 
circumstances (especially having to do with domination and inequality), 
2  These attempts prominently include those of Robert Filmer and Jacques-
Bénigne Bossuet.
3  Of course one can, without pathology, change minds through legislation 
in the trivial sense that, when created, such legislation becomes newly available 
for the content of individuals’ attitudes. I am above referring to Rousseau’s 
discussion of the pathology of trying to change, through legislation, the public’s 
evaluative opinion about some individual (LD: 68-69/OC: 5:63).
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and according to which the political mode can be understood, in turn, as 
shaping the affective mode (at least in an egalitarian republic).
In addition to its importance to an account of Rousseau’s view of 
persons and their different ways of relating to each other, this story will 
also turn out to have some interest as a contrast with contemporary 
Kantian accounts of affective phenomena (such as shame and love). Part 
of this derives from the fact that Kant himself carried into his moral 
philosophy aspects of Rousseau’s notion of the “Citizen,” particularly 
the idea of a person as to be treated as an end in themselves and as 
“above all price” (Kant, 1997a, 4:429, 4:434). But for reasons rooted in his 
own critical project (principally, the grounding of morality in impersonal 
reason), Kant did not understand that mode of relating to persons 
in terms of those same political problems for which, on Rousseau’s 
story, it was expressly introduced to solve. Therefore, in Kant’s moral 
philosophy (strictly construed) this mode of relating to persons operates 
apart from Rousseau’s way of contrasting it with the affective mode 
and the specific relationship between the two modes that Rousseau 
envisioned. Furthermore, in that context Kant recast Rousseau’s notion 
of the “Citizen” in the course of maintaining a dichotomy between two 
different kinds of incentives—duty and sensible inclinations—thereby 
leaving it to his readers to place affective phenomena on one or the other 
side of that dichotomy.4
This difference between Rousseau and Kant reflects deep 
philosophical differences between them (among them, over questions 
about the role of impersonal reason in morality, and over the relationship 
between morality and legality), and it would be virtually impossible to 
countenance, let alone adjudicate, all those differences here. And in fact 
Kant himself was clear about the consequences for affective phenomena 
(principally love) of his dichotomous understanding of incentives (that 
we must understand them as modeled either on duty or on sensible 
inclinations).5
4  This dichotomy in Kant’s understanding of incentives has been at 
the center of some recent papers by Kyla Ebels-Duggan (cf. Ebels-Duggan, 
forthcoming), to which I am greatly indebted.
5  As Ebels-Duggan points out, though this dichotomy governs Kant’s 
practical philosophy, it may not exhaust his complete understanding 
of motivation, once we take into account certain later texts outside his 
practical philosophy (strictly construed): for example, Kant’s remarks on the 
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But in the second part of this paper I will argue that certain 
adaptations of Kant’s views, which maintain a close association between 
affective phenomena and duty, are not entitled to central claims they 
make about those phenomena (namely, shame and love). These include 
Sarah Buss, who thinks that feeling shame allows one to “bootstrap” 
oneself into respect for others (as though the ways of relating to others 
characteristic of respect were primitively contained in our feeling 
shame before others); and J. David Velleman, who thinks that love is the 
maximal optional, and respect the minimal required, response to one 
and the same value (“personhood”). Rousseau is extremely attentive to 
the insight, articulated by Buss and Velleman, that there are emotional 
responses through which we appreciate the personhood of others. But 
by having available the resources to distinguish the affective from the 
political modes, Rousseau is able to capture this insight while avoiding 
these theories’ characteristic problems, including that (1) shame cannot 
provide a basis for respect insofar as the latter is a “deontic” attitude, i.e. 
something another is in a position to claim; and that (2) in understanding 
respect and love as minimal and maximal responses to one and the same 
value, Velleman in fact risks rendering love as a deontic attitude, or as 
something one can require from another.6 (Velleman explicitly disavows 
that consequence, as when he calls love an “optional” response to 
another’s personhood; my argument will consist in showing that he is 
not entitled to that disavowal.)
Therefore, Rousseau’s writing will provide us with a vision of how 
the political mode of relating to others might shape the affective mode 
“predisposition to humanity” in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
(cf. Kant, 1998: 6:27; Ebels-Duggan, 2019). Notably, the latter remarks are also 
the part of Kant’s writing in which commentators have been most consistent in 
detecting an allusion to Rousseau on amour-propre, the passion that below I will 
argue is central for understanding the affective mode (cf. Brooke, 2010, p. 52; 
Cohen, 2009, p. 116; Dent, 1992, pp. 35-36; Dent, 2005, pp. 105-106; Irwin, 2008, 
II, p.  881; James, 2013, pp. 69-70; Neuhouser, 2008, p. 140n23; Rawls, 2008, pp. 
199-200).
6  Kant himself draws a distinction between respect and relations of right, 
while treating them as analogous (Kant, 1996, 6:449). In this paper both will be 
treated as “deontic” in the relevant sense, since both a duty of respect and a duty 
of right can be intelligibly commanded, though only in the latter case can one be 
coerced into compliance.
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without (in contrast with these contemporary Kantian theories) risking 
that the affective mode collapse into the political.
Part 1: Rousseau on the Connection between the Affective and 
the Political
1.1. The Affective Mode of Relating to Others
Throughout his writings Rousseau recurs to the idea that constraint 
and force are inimical to such central areas of our emotional lives as love 
(E: 228, 349/OC: 4:513, 683-684), pleasure (C: 183-184/OC: 1:189-190; E: 
316/OC: 4:638; RSW: 74-88/OC: 1:1050-1059), and play (E: 148/OC: 4:403-
404). In this vein, Rousseau also articulates a distinctive way of relating 
to others, where another person is a locus of a kind of value (differential 
consideration of oneself) that cannot be forced or demanded without 
spoiling the very value it is meant to extract.
Rousseau tends to be most articulate about this point when 
contrasting humans’ social relations with the way of relating to the 
world characteristic of the asocial sauvage, or early human. In the original 
state of nature, the life of the sauvage was principally governed by the 
passion Rousseau calls amour de soi, or the desire for self-preservation. 
And the objects of amour de soi, such as food and shelter, were “ready 
to hand” (DI: 143/OC: 3:144), in that there was nothing in the nature of 
those objects such that they could not be had, and without spoiling their 
satisfactoriness, through force, exercises of the will, or the contingent 
limitations of the sauvage’s abilities. In this sense the sauvage related 
to the world as a world of things, something that even characterized 
his relations to others of his kind: he related to other humans just as 
instruments or impediments to the satisfaction of his self-preservation 
(DI: 218/OC: 3:219-220).7
But after time, according to Rousseau, with the birth of social 
relations (and in particular the moment in human history he calls 
“nascent society;” cf. DI: 167, 172/OC: 3:170, 176), “everything begins to 
change in appearance.”
7  This paragraph and the following one draw from Davies (2018). The 
rest of this section, as well as the discussion of domination in the following 
section, summarize a reading of Rousseau on amour-propre defended in Davies 
(unpublished MS).
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As ideas and sentiments succeed one another, as the 
mind and the heart grow active, [Humankind] continues 
to grow tame, contacts expand and bonds tighten. It 
became customary to gather in front of the Huts or 
around a large Tree: song and dance, true children of 
love and leisure, became the amusement or rather the 
occupation of idle men and women gathered together. 
Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish 
to be looked at himself, and public esteem [became 
prized]. The one who sang or danced the best; the 
handsomest, the strongest, the most skillful, or the most 
eloquent came to be the most highly regarded, and this 
was the first step at once toward inequality and vice: 
from these first preferences arose vanity and contempt 
on the one hand, shame and envy on the other; and the 
fermentation caused by these new leavens eventually 
produced compounds fatal to happiness and to 
innocence (DI: 166/OC: 3:169-170).8
In this moment humans’ mutual relations continue to be governed 
by amour de soi, but also by the passion he calls amour-propre, or 
the desire for consideration from others (cf. DI: 170/OC: 3:174). 
(Elsewhere Rousseau says that amour-propre is the passion that “makes 
comparisons,” (E 213/OC 4:493).) And whereas the sauvage had related 
to others just as instruments or impediments to his self-preservation, 
members of nascent society come to care about what others think of 
them, and thereby come to value something outside of what is available 
to force, exercises of their wills, or the contingent limitations of their 
abilities. After all, amour-propre is a passion distinct from amour de soi, 
and if the value of public esteem does not just consist in greater access to 
food and shelter (or other objects of amour de soi), but is rather valued for 
its own sake, then such esteem can only be satisfactory of amour-propre 
if it is seen as expressive of an independent point of view on oneself. In 
this sense, an independent point of view is not simply a point of view 
8  I have slightly modified Gourevitch’s translation.
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from somewhere else but rather the point of view of someone else, which is 
thereby independent of the deliberate exercises of my will.9
It is no longer the received or default reading of Rousseau to 
understand him as thinking that amour-propre is an intrinsically 
unhealthy passion.10 Recently Frederick Neuhouser has proposed an 
interpretation of amour-propre along the model of a Freudian drive, 
something neither in its nature good nor bad (cf. Neuhouser, 2008, 
p. 15), and (like the other passions, on Neuhouser’s reading) with a 
“purely biological source” that lacks direction until guided by separate 
“ideas” (cf. Neuhouser,  2008, pp. 15 and 176). But this interpretation 
of amour-propre as a Freudian or biological drive might not capture 
the way in which that passion essentially involves valuing others as 
independent points of view on oneself: that is, it might not capture the 
way in which it is internal to that passion that we maintain an “idea” of 
others as separate persons. Rousseau’s writing is especially evocative 
about this point in his Essay on the Origin of Languages, and particularly 
in his phenomenological description of the moment when early humans 
first came to feel the significance of others of their kind (as more than 
mere instruments).
A [sauvage] meeting others will at first have been 
frightened. His fright will have made him see these 
men as larger and stronger than himself; he will have 
called them Giants. After much experience he will have 
recognized that since these supposed Giants are neither 
bigger nor stronger than he, their stature did not fit the 
idea he initially attached to the word Giant. He will 
therefore invent another name common to them and to 
himself, for example the name man, and he will restrict 
the name Giant to the false object that had struck him 
during his illusion (EO 254/OC 5:381).
9  I owe this formulation to comments on an earlier draft of this paper by 
Jeremy Fix.
10  The earliest and most important study in English that contributed to 
the idea that there are healthy as well as unhealthy manifestations of amour-
propre was Dent (1988). But as Christopher Brooke notes, there were already 
some gestures toward this reading by John Plamenatz as early as the 1960s (cf. 
Brooke, 2016, pp. 148-149; Plamenatz, 1963, I, pp. 380 and 421-422).
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Here Rousseau is describing a distinctive way of being affected 
by others: one in which other persons are frightening not just because 
they figure as competitive threats or threats to one’s body, but because 
they are capable of evaluating oneself, of differentiating oneself from 
other beings. This is frightening for the sauvage—and other points of 
view figure for him as “Giants”—because whereas he had up to that 
point valued only those objects that were available to his will and 
the contingent limitations of his abilities (and so were in that sense 
“smaller” than him), he now comes to care about how others take him 
in, something manifestly outside his control (and so these others are 
in that sense “larger” than him).11 Rousseau intends this passage as a 
highly figurative account of the phenomenology of being startled by 
the evaluative judgment of another person, but we can also recognize 
its main idea—that in being so confronted by others they appear to us 
as significant, and significant for reasons other than their serving as 
instruments for our ends—in Rousseau’s own autobiographical accounts 
of taking himself to be alone, only to be startled by the presence of 
another (RSW: 81/OC: 1:1056). And, as both Rousseau and his attentive 
reader Jean-Paul Sartre recognized, it is an experience made vivid when 
we imagine moments of being caught doing something shameful (cf. 
Sartre 1956, pp. 252-302). In such moments of shame, one cannot help 
but take account of another person’s evaluative point of view on oneself: 
that person (even if they are a stranger) suddenly figures as significant 
not just because of how they might promote one’s own ends, but because 
one (often involuntarily) orients oneself for the sake of their perspective.
At one point Rousseau characterizes a certain sense of “freedom” as 
“not being subject to someone else’s will” (LWM: 260/OC: 3:841), and one 
way of summarizing the foregoing is to say that being subject to amour-
propre, in contrast with being subject principally to amour de soi, involves 
recognizing others as in that sense free, at least insofar as one values 
perspectives on oneself whose satisfactoriness depends on their being 
independent of deliberate exercises of one’s will. A further important 
contrast between the two passions consists in the idea that objects of 
amour de soi are intersubstitutable: for the sauvage, subject principally 
to amour de soi, any two qualitatively similar sources of satisfaction are 
11  A fuller defense of this reading of this passage of the Essay, and an 
argument for why we should think amour-propre is at play in it, appears in 
Davies (unpublished MS).
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equally satisfying. For example, the frustrations of losing a meal are only 
temporary so long as a sufficiently similar one is available. But things 
are fundamentally different when it comes to the insult characteristic 
upon having one’s amour-propre frustrated. When I value someone’s 
differential consideration, and that consideration is not forthcoming, as 
welcome as the differential consideration of others might be (even when 
they are somehow qualitatively similar to the person I care about), none 
of these others can make up for the insult occasioned by this particular 
individual and their thwarting of my amour-propre. We therefore have 
a sense of how amour-propre makes available to us a distinctive way of 
being affected by persons, and indeed a distinctively affective mode 
of relating to others: valuing others’ differential consideration at least 
involves recognizing those others as free (as sources of satisfaction 
unavailable to force and deliberate exercises of the will) and as individual 
(as not satisfactorily substitutable with other, even qualitatively similar, 
sources of satisfaction).12
1.2. The Affective Mode and Domination
Part of what older readings of Rousseau on amour-propre (as altogether 
bad or unhealthy) were responding to was that, once Rousseau describes 
the first appearance of amour-propre in nascent society, he immediately 
mentions the evils it brought about. Thus, in the passage quoted above, 
Rousseau says that from the first instances of valuing consideration from 
others “arose vanity and contempt on the one hand, shame and envy on 
the other” (DI: 166/OC: 3:169-170). But this passage also shows that it 
was not amour-propre alone that brought about the evils he associates 
with domination and inequality, for its first appearance was at most the 
“first step…toward inequality and vice,” and that it “eventually produced 
compounds fatal to happiness and to innocence” (DI: 166/OC: 3:169-
170, my emphases). Thus, it was the combination of amour-propre with 
additional social factors (principally inequalities in private property) 
that produced the circumstance of individuals’ seeking satisfaction of 
that passion in the domination of their dependents (see Neuhouser, 
2014, pp. 79-80).
12  I further explore the significance of having another’s freedom become 
salient to us in our valuing their differential consideration in Davies (2019) 
and (unpublished MS), as well as the significance of having their individuality 
become so salient to us in Davies (2018), which this paragraph draws from.
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To see this, we must recall that the introduction in humans of 
a capacity does not preclude the introduction, with it, of certain 
characteristic difficulties, or anxieties about how that capacity can go 
wrong. For example, learning to walk can bring with it new anxieties 
about tripping, and learning to speak can bring with it new anxieties 
about misspeaking or being misunderstood (cf. Cavell, 1994, p. 111; Fix, 
2020). Similarly, if being subject to amour-propre involves the capacity 
to appreciate others as independent points of view on oneself, then it 
should not be surprising that that capacity can also involve characteristic 
anxieties about being the object of another’s independent, evaluative 
judgment: including anxieties about how one is taken in by others—
about whether they will judge one well, or as one would like to be seen—
particularly if, in contrast with the objects of amour de soi, the objects of 
amour-propre are manifestly outside one’s powers of deliberate control. 
Rousseau is clear, in writing about his own social anxiety and social 
paranoia in his autobiographical writings, that such anxieties need not 
result in violence or in dominating others. (They might rather simply 
result in wanting to hide from others and their evaluative gazes; cf. C: 
45, 78-79/OC: 1:36, 75-76; RSW: 74-84/OC: 1:1050-1059; cf. Starobinski, 
1989.) Indeed, the fact that members of nascent society might not 
have been without such anxieties, but were nevertheless economically 
independent of one another (thereby precluding these anxieties from 
resulting in kinds of domination), might account for why Rousseau 
describes this period (marked by the first appearance of amour-propre) 
as “the happiest and the most lasting epoch,” and “the state [which was] 
best for man” (DI: 167/OC: 3:171).
But Rousseau also says that humans left this happy state only thanks 
to a “fatal accident” (DI: 167/OC: 3:171), by which (it soon becomes 
evident) he refers to the invention of private property and its original 
accumulation by some at the expense of others, thereby making the 
latter dependent on owners and lords for their subsistence needs. This 
circumstance interacts with amour-propre by allowing for expressions of 
that passion’s characteristic anxieties unavailable under conditions of 
economic independence: such as owners and lords demanding flattery 
and supplication from their dependents, or an understanding (perhaps 
not entirely conscious to all parties) that those dependents’ subsistence 
needs rest on their supplying such flattery and supplication to their 
superiors. After all, if those anxieties partly result from acknowledging 
the independence of others as evaluative points of view, then they 
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might meet their relief upon rendering those points of view as objects 
of control. Thus, Rousseau observes how, in conditions of accumulation 
at the expense of individuals’ subsistence needs, the latter partly get 
by through—their economic dependence on owners and lords partly 
consists in—their capacity to bestow differential consideration to their 
superiors. In other words, under such conditions, their survival depends 
partly on their affective labor.13
Much of the second half of Rousseau’s Second Discourse consists of 
an elaboration of the varieties of inequalities that result from the original 
accumulation of private property (at others’ expense), and how each of 
those kinds of inequality interact with amour-propre. In addition to (1) the 
inequalities in material wealth resulting from the original accumulation 
of private property, two further kinds of inequality figure prominently 
in Rousseau’s discussion: (2) inequalities in formal or legal status, and 
(3) inequalities in means of differential consideration.
(2) Thus, according to Rousseau, there is a standing tendency for 
inequalities in material wealth to be codified in a legal system. In his 
account, the first introduction of private property was for its owners an 
unstable condition so long as their right to property rested on “the right 
of the stronger” (i.e. their ability to defend their property by physical 
force) rather than a legally recognized right (cf. DI: 172/OC: 3:176). This 
resulted in owners’ establishing a social compact with their dependents 
in order to codify in law a right to their already-existing property.14 
Moreover, since such a compact codifies the legal rights of owners to 
their already-existing property (without redistribution based on human 
need), whatever “formal equality under the law” this compact effects is 
inherently precarious: owners tend to use their greater political power 
(afforded by their greater material resources, themselves codified under 
the law) to bend the application of the law in their favor. According 
to Rousseau, this inevitably leads to some enjoying greater legal status 
than others (cf. DI: 182/OC: 3:187). Rousseau also describes the worst 
13  Rousseau’s treatment of this topic can be read as drawing on his own 
experience of working in a variety of subordinate positions. Cf. Starobinski 
(1988, pp. 282-283).
14  Throughout I use “social compact” to refer to an agreement among 
several individuals; I use “Social Contract” to refer to the actual egalitarian 
contract that Rousseau articulates in The Social Contract. For a related distinction 
between compact and contract, see (Hasan, 2016, pp. 411-414).
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instances of such systems as those in which “the subjects have no other 
Law left than the will of the Master, and the Master no other rule than 
his passions” (DI: 185/OC: 3:191): and among those passions, we can 
suppose, is amour-propre. That is, it is hardly surprising when someone 
of higher legal standing exploits others’ dependence on them (for 
example, that others must satisfy their commands, at risk of being in 
violation of the “law”) in order to satisfy their desire for differential 
consideration. And we do not even need to imagine Rousseau’s limiting 
case of a society with “no other Law left than the will of the Master;” 
such general relations of domination are a standing risk characteristic 
of any society where the desires of particular individuals, as opposed 
to the shared general interests of all, determine the content of the law.
(3) Also, among the inequalities of concern to Rousseau are those in 
means of differential consideration: that is, the unavailability of a wide 
range of means of satisfying one’s need for differential consideration that 
do not themselves involve dominating others. In systems characterized 
by (1) material and (2) formal inequalities, owners of private property 
and administrators of inegalitarian states have a disproportionate 
influence over what the available means of differential consideration 
are. This is because, thanks to the structures of power they administer—
and especially because these structures allow for multiple hierarchical 
levels, where some who command over others are in turn commanded 
over by others—they can promise those who would occupy middle 
terms in that hierarchy opportunities for domination over others (on 
the condition of their being dominated by those occupying higher 
positions). This is how, according to Rousseau, individuals “come to 
hold Domination dearer than independence, and consent to bear chains 
so that they might impose chains [on others] in turn” (DI: 183/OC: 3:188; 
cf. LWM: 261/OC: 3:842).15
For Rousseau, each of these kinds of inequality (resulting from the 
invention of private property and its original accumulation) interacts 
15  This point, made by Rousseau in a roughly feudal context (and focusing 
on domination between individuals rather than between supra-individual 
entities such as classes, as well as on the dominator as consumer of differential 
consideration rather than as accumulator of a value to be sold on a market), 
nevertheless has an important echo in Marx’s comments on the functional role 
of English workers’ regarding themselves as dominating over Irish workers in 
the maintenance of their own domination by the ruling class (cf. Marx, 1975).
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in its own way with the affective mode of relating to others made 
available in amour-propre. That is, those dominating others (in the 
different ways made possible by these different kinds of inequality) 
are often responding to others’ qualities as independent points of view 
characteristic of the affective mode (of relating to them). Of course, in 
the present reading of Rousseau, this way of explaining the motivations 
behind kinds of domination invites paradox: if the dominator is, in their 
anxieties, responding to the quality of the dominated as an independent 
point of view, then rendering the latter an object of control might relieve 
their anxieties, but it would do so while undercutting their original 
acknowledgment (of the dominated as independent of their force or 
will). For the purposes of understanding Rousseau, we do not need to 
solve this paradox in the dominator’s attitudes. We may not even want 
to suppose that the dominator cannot be, in this respect, irrational or 
guilty of a practical contradiction. Rather, we only need to take seriously 
these attitudes as contributing to a social problem in need of solution.
1.3. The Political Mode as Addressing Domination
If we find this solution in Rousseau’s positive political writings, that 
is because Rousseau defines the “two principal objects” of every good 
“system of legislation” as “freedom and equality” (SC II.11.1). Indeed, in 
The Social Contract and related writings we find measures that address 
each of the three kinds of inequality that, in interaction with amour-
propre, engender forms of domination, or enforced dependence on 
particular others.
(1’) The Social Contract establishes material equality, in at least 
two respects. First, private property is alienated to the community so 
that it may be distributed according to human need (SC: I.9, II.11.2). 
Second, inequalities in wealth are limited so that “no citizen be so very 
rich that he can buy another, and none so poor that he is compelled 
to sell himself” (SC: II.11.2). That is, the Social Contract removes those 
conditions of material inequality that lead those lacking resources to 
depend on particular others for the satisfaction of their subsistence 
needs, a dependence that typically requires their affective labor.
(2’) The Social Contract also establishes formal equality under 
the law, both in the sense that the law makes no distinctions among 
categories of individuals, and in the sense that the law takes into 
account the fundamental interests of all individuals. This is part of 
what Rousseau means when he says that the General Will must “issue 
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from all in order to apply to all” (SC: II.4.5): in taking into account the 
fundamental interests of all individuals, it must thereby be general 
in content, or not “pronounce judgment on a particular man or fact” 
(SC: II.4.6). Otherwise, this would be to make the law partial to some 
individuals over others, and “Every condition imposed on each by all 
cannot be onerous to anyone” (LWM: 261/OC: 3:843). Therefore, the 
generality of the law precludes a condition in which some individuals’ 
interests determine the content of the law in ways leading to (either de 
facto or de jure) others’ dependence on their wills.
(3’) A further egalitarian measure central to Rousseau’s political 
writings is that of an optimally fair and impartial distribution of sources 
of differential consideration. In a way, this measure follows from (2’) in 
that every individual has a fundamental interest in—indeed, a need for—
having their desire for differential consideration in some way satisfied.16 
Rousseau says, “to provide for the public needs is a clear consequence 
of the General Will, and [one of] the essential [duties] of government” 
(DPE: 23/OC: 3:262). But Rousseau also articulates his vision of such an 
optimally impartial distribution (of sources of differential consideration) 
in his accounts of the public festivals and public prizes characteristic of 
a republic (cf. GP: 179, 181-182, 186/OC: 3:955, 957-959, 962-963; LD: 125-
137/OC: 5:114-121) and of systems of rewards for services rendered to 
the state (cf. DI: 221-222/OC: 3:222-223; GP: 227/OC: 3:1006-1007). Some 
liberal commentators on Rousseau have distanced themselves from what 
they see as “communitarian” measures meant, as Judith Shklar put it, “to 
remind men of their public role” (Shklar, 1969, p. 20; cf. Cohen 2010, pp. 
5 and 22). And some Marxist commentators have characterized these as 
“superstructural” measures meant to “inculcate virtue” (Levine, 1993, p. 
179; cf. Althusser, 1970, pp. 155-156).17 But even if these characterizations 
are accurate, we should keep in mind how these measures also have 
liberating ambitions, in that they help to alleviate one of the conditions 
(namely, the unavailability, or merely narrow availability, of sources of 
16  Both Dent and Neuhouser have written about the fundamental human 
need to be picked out from the manifold, and thus to be a “human presence” for 
others, that amour-propre expresses. Cf. Dent (1988, p. 24); Neuhouser (2008, pp. 
73-74).
17  However, see Galvano Della Volpe’s Marxist reading of Rousseau on 
differential rewards, a rich account that has helped to shape my understanding 
of many of the present issues: Della Volpe (1970).
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differential consideration) that, for Rousseau, can motivate individuals’ 
participation in relationships of domination.
A social compact introducing these measures will help to secure 
its members from “personal dependence,” particularly of the sort 
that facilitates domination (SC: 1.7.8).18 But for these measures to be 
meaningful, for them to prevent or alleviate conditions of personal 
dependence or domination, the Social Contract must introduce a kind of 
relationship (among members of the community) structured according 
to reciprocally acknowledged rights. Rousseau begins his account of 
how the Social Contract structures the relationships of its members 
when he says that all of the contract’s clauses “come down to just one”:
[Namely,] the total alienation of each associate with all 
of his rights to the whole community: For, in the first 
place, since each gives himself entirely, the condition 
is equal for all, and since the condition is equal for all, 
no one has any interest in making it burdensome to the 
rest (SC: I.6.6).
Rousseau does not here specify all of the respects—among them, 
(1’)-(3’) above—in which this condition is “equal for all.” But he does 
state that this social compact (involving the alienation of rights to the 
community, so as to structure rights according to the fundamental 
interests of all) amounts to the creation of a “moral and collective body”: 
18  (1’) and (2’) are very similar to, and my formulations of them directly 
influenced by, the measures that Neuhouser describes as Rousseau’s measures 
to secure personal independence through dependence on the General Will (cf. 
Neuhouser, 1993, pp. 387-391). But in place of my (3’) Neuhouser proposes that, 
for Rousseau, “the community itself [becomes] a source of the esteem sought by 
individuals as a consequence of their amour-propre. Law accomplishes this by 
ensuring that individuals enjoy an equality of respect as citizens” (Neuhouser, 1993, 
p. 90). Though this earlier formulation is ambiguous (and owes something to 
Dent’s influential suggestion that equal conditions of respect could be satisfactory 
of amour-propre; cf. Dent, 1988, Chapter 2), Neuhouser has more recently, and 
convincingly, argued that such conditions cannot alone be satisfactory of amour-
propre (cf. Neuhouser, 2008, pp. 59-70). Moreover, Neuhouser has imagined 
conditions in which “it is possible for all to desire to be the best (in some non-
trivial respect) [as in varieties of competition] and at the same time satisfy their 
amour-propre to a rationally acceptable degree” (Neuhouser, 2008, p. 102). My 
(3’) is influenced by Neuhouser’s later formulations.
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“which its members call (…) Sovereign when [it is] active,” and whose 
members “individually call themselves Citizens as participants in the 
sovereign authority” (SC: I.6.10).
In a helpful account of the above passage from The Social Contract, 
Joshua Cohen makes clear that when Rousseau talks about the “total 
alienation” of rights, he is not saying that members of the Social Contract 
lack rights, but exactly the opposite of that. According to Cohen, 
“Construing rights as claims that ought to be acknowledged by others, 
then, the existence of a general will requires the acknowledgment of 
rights.” Thus, Rousseau’s point is not that members of the community 
lack rights, “but that they claim those rights as members, and that all the 
rights are founded on the common good, understood non-aggregatively” (Cohen, 
2010, p. 83, Cohen’s emphasis).19 When Cohen says that these rights are 
“founded on the common good, understood non-aggregatively” (or 
understood “distributively”), he means that the common good (from 
which these rights derive) is not, as in varieties of utilitarianism and 
consequentialism, to be understood as the aggregate of individuals’ 
pleasures or particular goods. Rather, in taking into account the 
fundamental interests that all members of the Social Contract share, the 
General Will secures citizens’ rights to have those interests respected: 
that is, the General Will “distributes” certain general rights on the basis 
of those shared interests. Therefore, unlike in classical utilitarianism, the 
General Will cannot justify the thwarting of any citizen’s fundamental 
interests on the ground that it would promote “the common good” 
(understood aggregatively). In fact, on a distributive understanding, 
there is no “common good” above and beyond respect for citizens’ 
rights. And, as Cohen notes, Rousseau says of the suggestion that the 
government may “sacrifice one innocent person for the sake of the many” 
that it is “one of the most execrable maxims that tyranny ever invented 
(…) and the most directly contrary to the fundamental laws of society” 
(DPE: 17/OC: 3:256; cf. Cohen, 2010, pp. 41 ff.). It is in this sense—that no 
one’s fundamental interests may be justifiably “exchanged” for anyone 
19  A classic treatment of rights as claimable (and thus of the sort of 
connection between rights and claims that Cohen is presupposing in this 
passage) is Feinberg (1970).
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else’s benefit—that the rights and duties codified under the Social 
Contract are “deontological.”20
Therefore, the creation of this artificial body, the Sovereign, involves 
the creation of an artificial (or political) mode of relating to a person, 
the Citizen, whereby seeing another as a fellow citizen involves seeing 
them as bearing fundamental (and non-fungible) interests that one must 
respect, and also as required to respect one’s own fundamental (and 
non-fungible) interests. As this formulation suggests, seeing another as 
a citizen is reciprocal: the general requirements to which one is bound 
in virtue of that relation are the same general requirements to which 
any other is bound with regard to oneself. Rousseau says, “there is no 
associate over whom one does not acquire the same right as one grants 
him over oneself” (SC: I.6.8), and, he adds, “The commitments which 
bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual” 
(SC: II.4.5). This is a consequence of the generality of the Sovereign’s laws 
(which cannot “pronounce judgment on a particular man or fact,” (SC: 
II.4.6)), and of the requirement that “it is never right for the Sovereign to 
burden one subject more than another” (SC: II.4.9).
1.4. How the Political Mode Shapes the Affective
In a rich and challenging passage of Emile summarizing some major 
tenets of his social thinking, Rousseau says that “There are two sorts 
of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; [and] 
dependence on men, which is from society.” He adds that “dependence 
on men (…) engenders all the vices,” and “If there is any means of 
remedying this ill in society, it is to substitute law for man and to arm 
the general wills with a real strength superior to the action of every 
particular will” (E: 85/OC: 4:311). It is clear that by “dependence on men,” 
Rousseau is referring to the domination, or dependence on particular 
individuals, engendered by the sorts of inequality ((1)-(3)) discussed 
above; and we have just seen how the generality of the law, and the 
distribution of the shared interests of all into mutually acknowledged 
rights, is supposed to secure citizens against those sorts of inequality.
20  For the notion that the “common good” consists of the agreement of 
citizens’ interests, see SC: II.1.1. Rawls also understands that “the fundamental 
laws of [the social contract] are not to be founded on an aggregative principle” 
(Rawls 2008: 230).
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But in that same passage in Emile Rousseau adds that, in such 
a republic, “dependence on men would then become dependence 
on things again” (E: 85/OC: 4:311). And we may want to ask to what 
extent this passage suggests that the political mode of relating to others 
manifested in the Social Contract constitutes an “overcoming” of the 
affective mode of relating to others first manifested in nascent society. 
After all, in at least two respects the political mode indeed invites 
comparison with things (or the way of relating to things characteristic of 
the sauvage) as opposed to the way of relating to persons characteristic of 
those subject to amour-propre. First, in contrast with “persons” (under the 
affective mode), things are (at least for the sauvage) sources of satisfaction 
available to exercises of their will and the contingent limitations of their 
abilities. Similarly, under the political mode, acknowledging another 
as a fellow citizen also involves seeing them as a source of satisfaction 
available to exercises of the will (and the contingent limitations of one’s 
abilities) in the following narrow way: the respect for our rights that 
we can claim from fellow citizens is not spoiled by our so claiming it 
(where the act of claiming is understood as an exercise of the will). This 
follows from the fact that the General Will “distributes” rights based 
on the shared interests of all: and, in constituting the “common good,” 
those interests must be of the right kind to be distributed in the form of 
a right that one can claim. Any interest that would be spoiled in virtue 
of its being claimed could not, therefore, be understood as constituting 
the “common good” (rendered distributively).
Second, there is a peculiar sense in which, under the political mode, 
in acknowledging another as a citizen one relates to them as “general,” 
much as the sauvage relates to things as general: for the sauvage, any two 
qualitatively similar sources of satisfaction are equally good. (Again, the 
frustrations of losing a meal are only temporary so long as a sufficiently 
similar one is available.) This is similar to the mutual relations among 
citizens in that, whenever there is a question of whether another citizen 
is respecting one’s rights (or whether one is respecting theirs) the only 
features of their identity relevant to that question are the ways in which 
they instantiate the general descriptions of the law. (For example, if a 
citizen claims a right to medicine that others have in excess, any two 
citizens meeting that general description—of having the medicine in 
excess—will satisfy that citizen’s claim.) After all, as we have seen, in 
order that the law not be burdensome to any particular individual, and 
in order that it not favor any “particular will” (SC: II.4.9), the law that the 
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General Will promulgates cannot “pronounce judgment on a particular 
man or fact” (SC: II.4.6). Thus, there is a way in which, when we relate 
to each other as citizens, we relate to each other as nothing more than 
general conduits for the satisfaction of our shared fundamental interests 
(once again, rendered distributively).
But though in these two respects the political mode of relating to 
others invites comparison with relations to things, and thus accounts 
for Rousseau’s characterization of the General Will as making possible 
“dependence on things again” (E: 85/OC: 4:311), it would be an error to 
understand this as an overcoming or elimination of the affective mode 
of relating to others. After all, Rousseau says of the passions (including 
amour-propre, thanks to which the affective mode is made salient to us) 
that it is “an enterprise as vain as it is ridiculous to want to destroy them” 
(E: 212/OC: 4:490-491). Also, the political mode preserves and shapes the 
affective mode in the sense that among the mutually acknowledged rights 
characteristic of an egalitarian republic is, as we have seen (3’), a right 
to an optimally fair and impartial distribution of sources of differential 
consideration. To be clear, what this right amounts to could never be 
a right to a particular instance of differential consideration: it is in the 
nature of such consideration that its satisfactoriness would be spoiled 
if brought about by force or exercises of the will, including claims to 
right. But though a citizen cannot intelligibly claim a right to a particular 
instance of differential consideration from another citizen, they can 
intelligibly claim a right to a fair system of distribution of differential 
rewards and prizes from those institutional officers whose roles require 
that they uphold laws prohibiting unfair discrimination.21 Therefore, 
insofar as the need for differential consideration is among those shared 
fundamental interests that the General Will “distributes” into mutually 
acknowledged rights, relating to another as a citizen partly consists in 
relating to them as individuals with affective needs (even if we have no 
intelligible duty, as individuals, to supply those needs).
In fact, it might help us to specify the ways in which the political 
mode of relating to others shapes the affective mode—and why both 
modes are ways of relating to “persons”—by noting how the former 
involves a kind of projection, and even legal enforcement, of those 
21  This should be compared with violations of principles of what Rawls 
calls “fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1971, p. 73; cf. Neuhouser, 2014, pp. 
219-221).
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elements of seeing another (as free and as a non-fungible individual) that 
have emerged as characteristic of the affective mode. Under the affective 
mode, seeing another as free consists in seeing them as an independent 
point of view on oneself, and as a limit on what one can satisfactorily 
bring about by force. And under the political mode, seeing another as 
a citizen also consists in seeing them as free, but in two additional (but 
related) senses: (a) as making their own laws, (b) whose content enjoins 
us to respect their independence.22 (Rousseau refers to (a) as “moral 
freedom,” and to such (b) legally-enforced independence of the will of 
others as “civil freedom” (SC: I.8.3, SC: II.11.1-2).) That is, a consequence 
of the law’s taking into account the shared interests of all, so that it in 
some sense “issues from all” (SC: II.4.5), is that each of us is enjoined 
to respect the independence of all others; and this is enforced through 
the sorts of egalitarian measures, meant to secure individuals against 
“personal dependence” ((1’)-(3’)), mentioned above.
Furthermore, we have seen that a peculiar feature of the insult 
characteristic of being denied the differential consideration that one values 
in another is that the consideration of no other individual (not even one 
bearing sufficiently similar general traits) can make up for it: such insult 
is expressive of one’s valuing this person’s differential consideration. 
It is in this way that, under the affective mode, acknowledging 
another as a person (as a source of differential consideration) involves 
acknowledging them as an individual irreducible to their general traits. 
Moreover, we have seen that the requirements of conduct toward 
others that the Social Contract introduces are “deontological” in that 
the General Will “distributes” rights on the basis of all citizens’ shared 
interests rather than on the basis of an aggregative understanding of 
the common good. (This informs Rousseau’s insistence that under no 
condition may an innocent person be sacrificed for the sake of the many; 
cf. DPE: 17/OC: 3:256.) Therefore, under the political mode of relating 
to a person that Rousseau inscribes in the “Citizen,” acknowledging 
another as a person involves acknowledging them as an individual 
in the sense that they are valued as more than a bearer of, say, units 
22  My formulation here is inspired by Korsgaard (1997: p. xxviii).
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of pleasure that can be aggregated across persons, but principally as 
having certain fundamental, non-negotiable interests.23
In other words, via the political mode of relating to others, the 
Social Contract enforces (in the way that it can) the freedom and the 
individuality of others made salient under the affective mode, but which 
may be threatened under relationships of domination. And it also does 
so, thanks to measures like (3’) a right to an optimally fair and impartial 
distribution of differential rewards, by allowing the affective mode its 
healthiest expression (minimally characterized by domination) available 
to political measures. In these ways, we can say that the affective mode 
provides the content, and the political the form, of egalitarian relations 
with other persons.
Part 2: Contemporary Kantian Accounts of the Affective
I mentioned earlier that a legacy of Rousseau’s notion of the citizen 
in The Social Contract is its recasting by Kant in his moral philosophy: 
including in his understanding of a person as self-legislating (and thus 
as manifesting what Rousseau called “moral freedom” (SC: I.8.3)); as 
to be treated not merely as a means to our own particular ends (and 
thus as manifesting a version of what Rousseau called “civil freedom,” 
or the absence of “personal dependence” (SC: II.11.1-2)); as well as his 
characterization of a person’s dignity in terms of their being “above all 
price,” and their admitting of “no equivalent” (and thus as manifesting 
a version of Rousseau’s idea that no one’s fundamental interests may 
be justifiably exchanged for anyone else’s benefit; cf. Kant, 1997a, 4:429, 
4:434). But by understanding these as aspects of personhood as such, as 
opposed to a specifically political mode of relating to a person (meant to 
address those forms of inequality, (1)-(3), that interact with amour-propre 
to generate relationships of domination), Kant did not understand this 
mode of relating to persons as having the same significance it had for 
Rousseau: namely, as a contrast with the affective mode, which manifests 
in domination in inegalitarian conditions.24 (This becomes clearer once 
23  In fact, then, acknowledging others as citizens also requires 
acknowledging them as “separate persons,” in the sense of Rawls’s famous 
objection to classical utilitarianism (cf. Rawls, 1971, pp. 22-27).
24  Also, the fact that Kant relied on Rousseau’s “principles of right” in 
his understanding of morality, only separately to develop his own “Doctrine of 
Right” (Kant, 1996, 6:203-372), makes apparent that Rousseau, in contrast, had 
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we see that, though Kant’s Categorical Imperative prohibits varieties of 
domination, it might not be a sufficient basis to articulate, say, (3’), a 
right to a system of differential rewards, optimally fair or otherwise.25)
Part of this contrast between Rousseau and Kant can be accounted 
for by Kant’s dichotomous understanding of incentives: as consisting 
either of sensible inclinations to which we cannot reason, or of duties 
which must be articulable through “pure practical reason,” i.e. through 
consideration of the form of willing (cf. Kant, 1997a, 4:399; 1997b, 
5:72-73, 80). As Kyla Ebels-Duggan has argued in recent writing on 
this dichotomy, this explains why Kant thought of our talk of certain 
affective phenomena, such as love, as systematically ambiguous (cf. 
Ebels-Duggan, 2019; 2008, pp. 142-143): we may be referring either to an 
arational, sensible inclination, or to a “practical” kind of love—the duty 
to make others’ ends my own—that can indeed be commanded (and 
whose character as a duty admits of argument through the application 
of what Kant calls pure practical reason).26 Thus, any attempt to locate 
in this dichotomy Rousseau’s affective mode of relating to others will 
no such categorical distinction between legality and morality (cf. Kant, 1997b, 
5:71), or between a duty of right and a duty of virtue. (See SC: I.4.1, G: 160/OC: 
3:329.) But rather than have the effect of blending together the affective and the 
political (as I have argued above it does not), this is in fact an expression of 
Rousseau’s distinctive view that the content of morality is itself the outcome 
of material and political problem-solving. (See the references to “morality” 
and “virtue” at E: 85/OC: 4:311, as well as the role that the principles of the 
Social Contract play in Emile’s moral development; E: 458-71; see also Lavin 
(forthcoming.)) Note that this view is different from Kant’s view that all duties 
of right are indirectly duties of virtue (cf. Kant, 1996, 6:221; Ripstein, 2009, p. 
358), a view that nevertheless depends on a prior categorical distinction between 
right and virtue.
25  This is trivially the case insofar as the Categorical Imperative does not 
ground rights in their character as authorizing coercion (see Ripstein, 2009, 
p. 368). But even if Kant’s Universal Principle of Right (which, according to 
Ripstein’s reading, is an “extension” of the Categorical Imperative corresponding 
to the postulate that we are rational beings coexisting in space; cf. 2009, 370-372) 
should be understood as grounding a right to a system of differential rewards, 
that is not a possibility that Kant explicitly pursues.
26  For such discussions of love, see Kant (1996, 6:450; 1997a, 4:399; 1997b, 
5:83). For examples of such argument involving the application of pure practical 
reason, see Kant (1996, 6:393; 1997a, 4:423; 1997b, 5:34).
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model it either on an arational inclination or on duty. But the affective 
mode is distinctive: like with duty, our relations to others under it are 
articulable (in terms of our acknowledging them as independent points 
of view, and as individuals irreducible to their general traits); but unlike 
with duty, the kind of value we recognize in other persons under that 
mode, namely their differential consideration, cannot be satisfactorily 
commanded. Moreover, these aspects of persons, under the affective 
mode, are not articulable through applications of pure practical reason 
(or through categorical reasons), but rather through consideration of the 
conditions of satisfaction of a peculiar passion, namely amour-propre.
Any account of these differences between Rousseau and Kant will 
be a complicated interpretative matter. On the one hand, they derive 
from deep differences in their philosophical projects: including over the 
exact way in which impersonal reason enters into morality, and over the 
distinction between morality and legality. On the other hand, ironically, 
it seems plausible that Kant’s dichotomous understanding of incentives 
was informed partly by his reading of The Social Contract, and especially 
by Rousseau’s remark that the civil state substitutes “justice for instinct” 
in our conduct, allowing us to “consult [our] reason before listening 
to [our] inclinations” (SC: I.8.1). (My arguments about amour-propre, a 
passion mention of which is notoriously absent from The Social Contract, 
have been meant to show that the distinction Rousseau makes in this 
passage, between “right” and “appetite,” cannot be exhaustive of his 
understanding of motivations, or of our ways of relating to others.27)
Therefore, in the following, I am not concerned with adjudicating 
these differences, but  rather with exploring the problems that arise 
27  Further complicating these issues is that, as I note above, in other 
contexts (in particular Kant, 1998, 6:27) Kant can be read as articulating a kind of 
motivation modeled on Rousseau’s understanding of amour-propre. (What Kant 
calls the “predisposition to humanity” is a kind of “self-love” that is “physical 
and yet involves comparison (for which reason is required)” (1998, 6:27).) In 
addition, saying that in his practical philosophy Kant relies on a dichotomous 
understanding of incentives does not tell us how strict we should understand 
this dichotomy to be, something that I will not further explore here as a matter 
of Kant interpretation. Note, though, that it cannot be so strict as to exclude the 
possibility of forming sensible inclinations on the basis of the habitual carrying-
out of duty (cf. Kant, 1996, 6:402, 457; 1997b, 5:83), a thought that plays a role in 
Barbara Herman’s Kantian account of character-formation (cf. Herman, 2007, p. 
11). I thank two anonymous referees for comments bearing on this note.
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when Kant’s dichotomy is applied in certain contemporary accounts 
of affective phenomena: Sarah Buss’s writing on shame (according to 
which Kantian respect is primitively contained in our feeling of shame 
before others), and J. David Velleman’s writing on love (according to 
which love and Kantian respect are, respectively, the maximal optional 
and minimal required responses to the same value, “personhood”). 
Since I will argue that Buss and Velleman are not entitled to claims they 
make about affective phenomena that Kant himself never explicitly 
made, my arguments should not be imputed to Kant. Nevertheless, a 
notable shared feature of both Buss’s writing on shame and Velleman’s 
writing on love is the weight they place on Kant’s identification between 
respect and a certain feeling, particularly a feeling associated with seeing 
or looking, namely reverence (cf. Kant, 1996, 6:402). Indeed, Buss and 
Velleman think of shame and love, respectively, as emotions through 
which we perceive the personhood of others. What I will insist on is that 
from Rousseau’s writing we can appreciate that talk of looking at other 
persons, or being exposed to other persons, need not so immediately 
suggest notions of duty, and that what is at stake in these discussions is 
the risk of our losing touch with the distinctive way of being affected by 
others central to Rousseau’s writing on amour-propre.
2.1. Buss on Shame
Sarah Buss characterizes shame as a “natural disposition to see one 
another as respect-worthy,” and she says that “shame is respect in its 
primitive, prereflective mode” (1999, pp. 520 and 537). In other words, 
for her, shame is a kind of Kantian respect, where treating others with 
respect is a matter of accommodating “our ends to the ends of others” (p. 
535). The reason Buss thinks that shame has this character, as a primitive, 
prereflective kind of respect, is that in feeling ashamed one cannot help 
but appreciate that there are other evaluative perspectives besides one’s 
own: “To experience shame is to experience oneself as for another; it is 
to ‘confess’ that there is more to the significance of one’s activities than 
their significance relative to one’s personal perspective” (p. 526).28 Moreover, 
Buss thinks that this way of approaching shame allows us to address 
a certain moral skeptic, at least about “categorical imperatives”: “We 
need merely point out to the skeptic that he, too, has had an experience 
28  With the word “confess,” Buss is drawing on Sartre (1956, p. 261).
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[namely, shame] whose content is incompatible with his skepticism” (p. 
540). For Buss, any skeptic about the legitimacy of another’s claim on our 
respect who also feels shame before that other (and thus acknowledges 
“the nonstrategic relevance of another person’s evaluative judgments” 
(p. 536)) is guilty of a kind of practical contradiction.
I do think that there is something consonant between Buss’s writing 
on shame and Rousseau’s writing on amour-propre, at least in that 
(according to the present reading of the latter) when we feel ashamed 
the character of amour-propre as revealing the personhood of another 
(under the affective mode) is especially apparent. But the immediate 
worry, then, should be whether that is a sufficient basis for arriving 
at a notion of Kantian respect. After all, what shame reveals to us is 
a person (characteristic of the affective mode) understood as a source 
of differential consideration. This is why the kind of consideration 
from another we care about when feeling ashamed is not just outside 
our forceful control, but also outside what we can claim or command. 
(Sure enough, we can command another to avert their gaze from us, 
but we cannot satisfactorily render their evaluative judgment an object 
of control.) Moreover, there is no expectation that the acknowledgment 
of another involved in shame is mutual or reciprocal: that is, there is 
no apparent requirement (normative or otherwise) that, when feeling 
ashamed before another, and thereby acknowledging them as a person, 
they must (as a matter internal to this encounter) acknowledge oneself 
as a person as well.29 Indeed, often in shame we are made to feel 
“an object,” suggesting that there is indeed no incoherence, in either 
party, in one’s feeling ashamed before another who sees oneself as 
nothing but an object, a thing, or a non-person.30 An absence of mutual 
acknowledgment does not render an interaction deficient as a case of 
29  Cf. Setiya’s discussion of Levinas’s idea that “personal acquaintance” is 
“unilateral” or “non-symmetrical” (unpublished MS).
30  In his famous discussion of shame, which Buss in fact draws from, 
Sartre extensively discusses, as a feature of shame, one’s being made an “object” 
(1956, pp. 252-302). But Sartre employs a technical understanding of “object,” 
distinguished from “subject”—derived from the grammatical object and subject—
thereby suggesting that being made an object is a necessary feature of shame. 
My point above is that (in contrast with respect) non-recognition of a person 
does not render an interaction deficient as a case of shame. This point does not 
depend on the idea that being made an “object” (in some sense other than the 
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shame, but may in fact be paradigmatic of shame. (This does not mean 
that there is no normative significance in acknowledging another as a 
person when feeling shame. It means only that there is nothing in shame 
by itself suggesting that the acknowledgment must be reciprocal.)
Furthermore, we have seen that there is available a related but 
different mode of relating to a person, the political mode, which may 
or may not be identified with Kantian respect, but which involves, in 
contrast, seeing a person as a source of non-differential consideration—
which can be claimed or commanded, and which is indeed reciprocal. 
That is, in acknowledging another as a person in this different sense, 
there is a normative requirement that they acknowledge oneself as a 
person, in this sense, as well. (Something has gone wrong, internal to 
an interaction’s character as an acknowledgment of rights, when that 
acknowledgment is only one-sided.) Therefore, if we want to capture 
the insight that feeling ashamed involves acknowledging another as a 
person, then it seems we will want to keep these modes—affective and 
political—separate. And we do not yet have reason to think that the 
political mode of relating to a person, or any of its characteristic features 
(such as reciprocity, or the availability of consideration one can claim or 
command), is at play in shame.
In some ways, this point (that the evaluative perspectives on 
oneself valued when feeling shame may be an insufficient basis for full 
Kantian respect) is little different from Buss’s own avowed divergences 
from Kant. Thus, some of the above may be what she means in calling 
shame not an unqualified form of respect, but respect in a “primitive, 
prereflective mode.” And Buss distances herself from Kant in her not 
wanting to ground respect in “something impersonal,” namely the 
impersonal reason in which all subjects participate, but in something 
“irreducibly personal,” namely another’s point of view on ourselves and 
our motives (cf. Buss, 1999, p. 546). (In other words, Buss may not even 
be seeking to account for the reciprocal character of Kantian respect, 
if that is to be understood as bound up with “impersonal” reason.) 
Nevertheless, by not distinguishing between the affective and political 
modes, and by supposing there is just one relevant mode of relating 
to a person (which feeling shame makes salient to us), Buss gives the 
impression that her account of shame yields more (particularly, more 
grammatical one) is a necessary feature of shame. I am grateful to discussion of 
this issue with Richard Moran.
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under the label “personhood”) than it in fact does. In particular, she 
gives the impression that it yields a notion of respect with the “deontic” 
character (of rights over oneself that others have the power to claim) we 
have seen as distinctive, not of the affective mode that shame and other 
manifestations of amour-propre make salient, but of the political mode of 
relating to a person. (Buss talks about “respecting one another’s rights” 
as a minimal response to the “sublime” or awe-inspiring character of 
other persons made salient in shame; cf. 1999, p. 548).31
Therefore, a Rousseauist interpretation of Buss’s argument would 
state that nothing in her account of the ends or personhood that shame 
reveals to us has taken us outside the realm of the affective mode of 
relating to a person. Again, this is not at all to say that an examination of 
shame has no normative significance, or no significance concerning how 
we should treat others. But the only norms we should expect from such 
an account are those bearing on the status (characteristic of the affective 
mode) of others as independent points of view on oneself. For Rousseau: 
if we want to understand what grounds the rights of others—that is, 
if we want to understand what gives others the power to make claims 
against oneself—nothing short of a contract between oneself and others 
will supply that. Though he is rarely associated with the issue of moral 
skepticism, Rousseau was indeed concerned to show what interest we 
have in obeying what he called “principles of right.”32 But his way of 
doing that was not to attempt to prove that those principles are somehow 
already primitively contained in our affective responses to others. It 
was, rather, to attempt to show that our affective responses to others (in 
31  Again, the Categorical Imperative cannot ground rights in their 
character as authorizing coercion (see Ripstein, 2009, p. 368); this requires Kant’s 
Universal Principle of Right, which depends on an understanding of us as 
rational beings coexisting and interacting in space (see pp. 370-372). In contrast, 
Buss—in another (likely conscious) divergence from Kant—begins her account 
of respect and duty with that understanding of humans.
32  “I shall try always to combine what right permits with what interest 
prescribes, so that justice and utility not be disjoined” (SC: I.1.1). In the Geneva 
Manuscript of The Social Contract, Rousseau aimed to show that his account 
of principles of right, unlike Diderot’s, could address a kind of skeptic asking 
“what interest I have in being just” (G: 3:286). For discussion, see Bertram (2004, 
pp. 45-52).
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inegalitarian conditions) generate problems, principally domination, to 
which only egalitarian principles of right are the solution.33
2.2. Velleman on Love
In a series of papers, J. David Velleman has argued that love is a 
matter of “vividly perceiving” another’s personhood (1999, 2008). He 
says, “A sense of wonder at the vividly perceived reality of another 
person is (…) the essence of love” (2008, p. 199). Part of what that means, 
according to Velleman, is that love “arrests our emotional defenses” 
against another person, “leaving us emotionally vulnerable” to them 
(2008, p. 201). Thus, in vividly perceiving another’s personhood, “our 
emotional defenses toward [them] have been disarmed,” leaving us 
open to feeling toward them “sympathy, empathy, fascination,” but also 
“hurt, anger, resentment, and even hate” (1999, p. 361).
The audacious character of Velleman’s view consists in the fact that 
he identifies the value we vividly perceive in love with the very same 
value grounding Kantian respect:
The Kantian view is that respect is a mode of valuation 
that the very capacity for valuation must pay to instances 
of itself. My view is that love is a mode of valuation that 
this capacity may also pay to instances of itself. I regard 
respect and love as the required minimum and optional 
maximum responses to one and the same value (1999, 
p. 366).
For Velleman, this theory is attractive in its avoiding any appearance 
of incompatibility between love and impartial morality (especially the 
impartial morality of Kant’s moral philosophy): love no longer appears 
as a partial response to other persons on the basis of values other than 
morality, but as a response to the very same value grounding moral 
respect: their being a “rational will” (or a person). Thus, the selective 
33  In fact, Rousseau, who draws particular attention to shame among 
those very affective responses, can be understood as in deep agreement with 
someone like Buss who thinks that shame plays a role in the “genealogy” (as we 
might put it) of deontic relations with others. But in insisting on the essentially 
political character of those latter relations, Rousseau also offers an alternative 
to any rendering of that genealogy in terms of primitive containment or 
“bootstrapping.”
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character of love (that we love some persons as opposed to others) is to 
be accounted for not in terms of the value or personhood (under that 
conception of personhood) to which love is a response, but in terms of 
the empirically manifested qualities that serve as “signs” of that value 
(cf. Velleman, 1999, p. 197). This has resulted in Velleman’s offering 
deep and interesting arguments aiming to show that such empirically 
manifested qualities can constitute “signs” of someone’s value as a 
self-existing end; that what we value in love is nothing other than the 
person’s status as a self-existing end; and that the fact that all persons are 
self-existing ends (that they have what Kant calls “dignity”) precludes 
their admitting replacements in value: “What makes something truly 
irreplaceable is a value that commands appreciation for it as it is in itself, 
without comparison to anything else, and hence without substitutions” 
(Velleman, 1999, p. 369).
Just as with Buss’s treatment of shame as a way of perceiving 
another’s personhood, I think there is something very agreeable from 
a Rousseauist perspective about Velleman’s treatment of the idea that 
there are affective responses to others (whether or not we want to call 
them “love”) through which we vividly perceive another’s personhood. 
Indeed, many of Velleman’s characterizations of our “emotional 
disarmament” before another person are consonant with Rousseau’s 
treatment of the anxieties involved in amour-propre, particularly 
those involved in being the object of another’s independent point of 
view. Moreover, I have argued that in valuing another as a source of 
differential consideration, we thereby value them as a non-fungible 
individual (though my argument rested on what satisfying differential 
consideration consists in, and not, as in Velleman’s case, on the Kantian 
notion of the “rational will” and its inherent dignity). Perhaps most 
importantly, I think our understanding of Rousseau’s writing on amour-
propre would be greatly improved if it were read in light of Velleman’s 
treatment of love as an “object-based,” as opposed to “aim-based,” 
kind of valuing, where valuing is to be understood as a response to an 
already-existing end (or “object”)—such as  (in the case of amour-propre) 
another person’s independent point of view—rather than as aiming to 
produce something valuable. (When we are motivated by amour-propre 
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to bring about new results, it is “for the sake” of such independent 
points of view.34)
Nevertheless, in supposing that the personhood of another we 
appreciate through love is the very same as that grounding the respect 
we owe to others (as persons), Velleman risks rendering love as a species 
of respect, and thus rendering it as a “deontic” attitude: or an attitude 
one can demand from another, and which the other can be blamed for 
withholding.35 This is of course what Velleman means to deny in the 
above-quoted passage: in comparing respect and love, he says that 
they are the “required minimum” and “optional maximum” responses 
to another’s personhood (1999, p. 371). And it is clear enough how 
Velleman arrives at the idea that love is the “maximum” response to 
another’s personhood; the emotional disarmament before another that 
Velleman thinks characteristic of love indeed goes well beyond the 
response to another we think characteristic of respect. But it is not clear 
what entitles Velleman to the statement that that response is “optional.” 
After all, if love is a response to the very same value as that grounding 
respect (which can be demanded), and if we suppose that, as an objective 
matter, some individual manifests that value (“personhood”), then what 
error is that individual making in demanding from another the maximal 
response to that value? How is it not a consequence of Velleman’s theory 
that emotional disarmament before another’s personhood is, despite our 
expectations, something one can be blamed (at least by that individual, 
when it matters to them) for withholding?
Velleman appears to be aiming at addressing this sort of worry 
when he accounts for the selectivity of love in terms of the fact that our 
emotional resources, and thus the resources allowing for emotional 
disarmament before others, are scarce.
34  Velleman criticizes Freudian drive-based accounts of love on the 
ground that they are aim-based rather than object-based (cf. 1999, pp. 349-351). 
This may, then, constitute a further difference between my understanding of 
amour-propre and Neuhouser’s understanding of it on the model of a Freudian 
drive (cf. Neuhouser, 2008, pp. 15 and 176).
35  Here I use “deontic attitude” in Darwall’s sense: “Unlike blame and 
resentment, which presuppose some authority to make claims and demands of 
others and hold them accountable for compliance, love is not a deontic attitude. 
Even in friendship, love is nothing we can claim or hold others to account for” 
(Darwall, 2015).
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One reason why we love some people rather than others 
is that we can see into only some of our observable 
fellow creatures. The human body and human behavior 
are imperfect expressions of personhood, and we are 
imperfect interpreters (…). We are constitutionally 
limited in the number of people we can love; and we 
may have to stop short of our constitutional limits in 
order to enjoy the loving relationships that make for a 
good life (Velleman, 1999, p. 372).
But it is hard to see how bringing up this idea (that we are imperfect 
in our appreciation of others’ personhood, and our emotional resources 
are limited) is favorable to Velleman’s view. This much was granted in 
my framing of the objection when I noted that it may be that only some 
are motivated to blame others for withholding their love.36 Thus, the 
objection does not require imputing to Velleman’s view the consequence 
that it renders a “universal right” to love, or a right that everyone has 
an interest in securing for all. Moreover, when we think about other 
scarce resources (such as clean water and adequate healthcare), their 
character as “scarce” does not abrogate the idea that those denied them 
can, without error or unintelligibility, demand them. At most (though 
not always) their character as “scarce” figures as an excusing condition 
when that perfectly intelligible demand cannot be met. Therefore, 
pointing out that there is scarcity in our emotional resources with regard 
to others does not (assuming Velleman’s view that love is the maximal 
response to the same value as respect) make love have less of a deontic 
structure; rather, it just makes that structure more complex, and more 
similar to our actual deontic relations with others (particularly those 
arising in an economy).37
36  There might in fact be relationships in which such blame is legitimate: 
for example, it is arguable that a child may legitimately blame their parent for 
withholding love from them. But what I am saying about Velleman’s view is that 
it is hard to see (supposing that view) what error is being made by an individual 
motivated to blame any other individual for withholding their love (whatever 
their relationship might be).
37  Kant was especially clear in his understanding of this consequence, at 
least insofar as he understood that a kind of love rooted in respect for the law 
(“practical love”) can indeed be commanded (cf. Kant, 1997a, 4:399; 1997b, 5:83).
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Furthermore, it would be surprising if it were only a feature of our 
emotional resources (awaiting only a science-fiction refueling of our 
currently scarce ones) that accounted for the optionality and selectivity 
of love, as opposed to something about the nature of love itself. 
Velleman accounts for that optionality and selectivity only in terms of 
our “imperfection”: we are imperfect in displaying personhood before 
others, and we are imperfect in interpreting it in others. But might that 
imperfection be overcome? It seems that Velleman’s view is consistent 
with the idea that in paradise (or some kind of paradise), where our 
emotional resources are plentiful, love —what Velleman himself calls the 
realization that “someone other than oneself is real” (2008, p. 199)38—can 
be (intelligibly, without error) demanded from another. And (however 
distant such paradise might be) that indicates that something important 
about our affective responses to other persons, and their precluding 
demands, has been underemphasized here.
Rousseau’s writing suggests a way of approaching these issues, and 
of capturing the notion of “vividly perceiving” another’s personhood, 
that does not force these problems on us. And again, this is because 
Rousseau does not condense relations of duty and affective relations 
with others into a single mode of relating to a person. The affective 
mode made salient in our being subject to amour-propre is not the same 
as the political mode characteristic of relations of duty under the Social 
Contract. Thus, there is no question of whether the acknowledgment 
of others as affective persons—as objects of our amour-propre—can 
ground a demand from them that we “fully” value them as sources of 
differential consideration, or that we fully expose ourselves to the range 
of emotions concomitant with valuing them in that way. And I think we 
can partly account for this difference between Rousseau and Velleman 
in that, whereas Rousseau begins with the idea that the precluding of 
demands defines the affective realm—an idea that throughout informs 
his writing related to seeing others—Velleman begins with a prior 
38  Velleman is there adapting a phrase of Iris Murdoch (cf. Murdoch, 
1997:215).
335The Affective and the Political: Rousseau and Contemporary Kantianism
Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 59, jul-dic (2020) ISSN: 0188-6649 (impreso), 2007-8498 (en línea) pp.301-339
notion of personhood (inherited from Kantian respect) and then must 
thereafter account for the optionality and selectivity of love.39
2.3. Conclusion
In saying that Buss and Velleman have not, in contrast with Rousseau, 
made sufficient space for a distinctively affective mode of relating to 
others (or have been too quick in associating that mode with the political 
mode), my point has not at all been that Rousseau is a dualist over a 
matter where Buss and Velleman are something like monists. After all, 
I have suggested that these views’ close association between affective 
phenomena and duty itself derives from their particular application 
of Kant’s dualism, within the category of incentives, between sensible 
inclinations and duty. Moreover, I have insisted that the affective and 
the political modes are not, for Rousseau, isolated sides of a distinction: 
rather, the affective mode supplies the content and the political mode 
the form of egalitarian relations with persons. If a legacy of Rousseau’s 
writing is a complex account of the relationships between these two 
modes, then it is also that of exposing the problems we will encounter 
whenever we are prone—in a temptation likely not unique to 
contemporary Kantians—to think of one principally in terms provided 
by the other.40
39  I do not think that the above argument is applicable to every adaptation 
or development of Velleman’s view. For example, I do not think it is applicable 
to recent arguments by Ebels-Duggan and Setiya that both respect and love are 
responses to another’s humanity (cf. Ebels-Duggan, forthcoming; Setiya, 2014), 
at least insofar as those arguments treat respect and love as different kinds of 
attitudes (according to a principled distinction between those kinds) as opposed 
to (as on Velleman’s view) different levels along a grade. For example, Ebels-
Duggan has argued that love, unlike what she calls “generalized respect,” cannot 
be arrived at through argument or reasoning (Ebels-Duggan, forthcoming), 
while Setiya has argued for the significance of “personal acquaintance” in love 
(Setiya, unpublished MS).  Accordingly, Ebels-Duggan and Setiya can be read as 
making a distinctive space for affective phenomena (not just in love, but in the 
phenomena they  call “singular respect” and “personal concern,” respectively), 
even if they do not conceive them in exactly the way Rousseau conceived of 
amour-propre.
40  I thank the following people for their advice on various versions of 
this paper: Matthew Boyle, Sandy Diehl, Jeremy Fix, Richard Moran, Oded 
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DI (1997). Discourse on Inequality (Discourse on the Origin and Foundations 
of Inequality  among Men). In The ‘Discourses’ and Other Early Political 
Writings. (pp.  111-222). Victor Gourevitch (trans.), Cambridge 
University Press.
DPE (1997). Discourse on Political Economy. In The Social Contract and 
Other Later Political  Writings. (pp. 3-38). Victor Gourevitch (trans.), 
Cambridge University Press.
E (1979). Emile, or on Education. Allan Bloom (trans.), Basic Books.
G (1997). Geneva Manuscript. In The Social Contract and Other Later Political 
Writings. (pp. 153-161). Victor Gourevitch (trans.), Cambridge 
University Press.
GP (1997). Considerations on the Government of Poland. In The Social Contract 
and Other Later Political Writings. (pp. 177-260). Victor Gourevitch 
(trans.), Cambridge University Press.
LD (1969). Letter to d’Alembert on the Theater. In Politics and the Arts. Allan 
Bloom (trans.), (pp. 3-137). Cornell University Press.
LWM (2001). Letters Written from the Mountain. In The Collected Writings 
of Rousseau. Vol. 9. (pp. 131-306). Judith R. Bush and Christopher 
Kelly (trans.), University Press of New England.
OC (1959-1969). Oeuvres complètes. 5 vols. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel 
Raymond (eds.), Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.
RSW (1992). The Reveries of the Solitary Walker. Charles E. Butterworth 
(trans.), Hackett Publishing.
SC (1997). On the Social Contract. In The Social Contract and Other Later 
Political Writings. (pp. 39-152). Victor Gourevitch (trans.), Cambridge 
University Press. ‘SC: I.4.6.’ refers to book I, chapter 4, paragraph 6.
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